Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Jonathan Little and Hannah Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Sharon Peacock; Craig L. Barlow; Attorneys for Appellants;
David E. Littlefield; Attorney for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, No. 18113 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2739

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------••

JONATHAN LITTLE and
HANNAH LITTLE,

••

·Plaintiffs-Respondents,

-vs-

.•
.•

.case No •
18113

••

(~UTAH STATE DIVISION

·aF·· FAMILY SERVICES,

••

Defendants-Appellants.

••

.
-------------BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

.
-------------APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT: COURT, IN AND FOR 'SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
.OF .UTAH, THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General·
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellants
f;DAVID E. LITTLEFIELD
425 South Fifth East

:~l.;:$alt. Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED

Attorney for Respondents

MAR 3~1982

.... ....

.........................................

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.dDr~, Supcrl>?n9 c~crt.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Uta~

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JONATHAN LITTLE and
H..~NAH LITTLE I

·

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

..

.Case No •

-vs-

18113

UTAH STATE DIVISION
OF FAMILY SERVICES,

..

.. Defendants-Appellants.

..

-

.

----------BRIEF OF F...PPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN Jl.ND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, JUDGE

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SH?_RON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorney General

--

CRP. . IG L.

BARLOW

Assistant Attorney General
236 State CapiLOl
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellants
DAVID E. LITTLEFIELD
425 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
At~ornev

for Resoondents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE--------------------------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT---------------------------- 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------ 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY THE
APPELLANT DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICES' MOTION TO DISMISS
BASED ON THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT--------------------- 5
A:
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES
WHICH RESULT FROM THEIR EXERCISE
OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION------- 6
B:
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES
RESULTING FROM THE PERFORMANCE OR
FAILURE TO PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION--------------------- 9
POINT II:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
DR. JANICE SARGEANT TO TESTIFY---21
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICES WAS NEGLIGENT-----------26
POINT IV:
THE NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, OF THE
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE DEATH OF JENNIFER LITTLE-----34
CONCLUSION--------------------------------------------43
CASES CITED
Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977 (10th Cir.
1979)---------------------------------------16
Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 481 P.2d
430 (1971)----------------------------------18
Carroll v. State Road Corrunission, 496 P.2d 888
(Utah, 1972)-------------------------------- 9-12
City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska,
1962)---------------------------------------40
Cooke v. Mortensen, 526 P.2d 675 (Utah, 1981)---------35,37

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
{Continued)
Page
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct.
956 (1953)---------------------------------- 15
Day v. Lorenzo Smith and Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221,
408 P.2d 186 (1965)------------------------- 22,23
Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073 (Utah, 1955)------------ 35,36
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah, 1979)---- 24
Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980)~-- 19
Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah, 1976)------------ 11,12
Evangelical United Breth. Church of Adna v. State,
67 Wash.2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1966)--------- 13
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (1980)------------------- 15
Gray v. United States, 445 F.Supp. 337 {S~D. T~x~s
- ·
1978)--------------------------------------- 17
Griffin v. United Stat~s, 500 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir.
19 7 4) --------------------------=------------_;- 1-7
Jarret v. Wills, 235 Ore. 51, 383 P.2d ~9~ (1963)----- 13
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah,
1981)--------------------------------------- 8
Hall v. Blackham, -417 P.2d 664 (Utah, 1966)----------- 34
May v. Baklini, 509 P.2d 1345 (N.Mex., 1973)---------- 35
Schafer v. State of Montana Department of
Institutions, 592 P.2d 493 (Montana, 1979)-- 41,42
Sheffield v. Turner, 2 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367
(1968)-------------------------------------- 19
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177 (Utah,
1971)--------------------------------------- 37
Sly v. Board of Education of Kansas City, 516 P.2d
895 (Kansas, 1973)-------------------------- 41
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 605 P.2d
1230 (1980)--------------------------------- 7,8
Sullivan v. United.States, 129 F.Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
1955)--------------------------------------- 15
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith Inc., 132 P.2d 680 (Utah,
1943)--------------------------------------- 35
Thomas v. Bokelman, 462 P.2d 1020 {Nev. 1970)--------- 34,37,41
Thomas v. Clearfield City, No. 17338, filed February
24, 1982------------------------------------ 8
Widefield Homes, Inc. v. Griego, 416 P.2d 365
(Colo. 1966)-------------------------------- 39
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 55-15b-l (1953), as arnended---------§ 63-30-3 (1953), as amended----------§ 63-30-10(1) (1953), as amended-------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

7
6,7,8
5,9

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
22 Am.Jur.2d, Death, § 222--------------------------- 34
35 Am.Jur. Federal Tort Claims Act § 19-------------- 9
Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 241------------------------ 35
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 56(2)------------------- 21,23

...

-111-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

..

JONATHAN LITTLE and
HANNAH LITTLE,

Case No.
18113

Plaintiff-Respondents,

..

-vsUTAH STATE DIVISION
OF FAMILY SERVICES,

..

Defendants-Appellants.

..

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATKMENT OF THE CASE
This was a wrongful death action brought by the
natural parents of Jennifer Little, a child who died while
in foster care.

Judgment was entered against the Utah

Division of Family Services and damages awarded in the
amount of $20,000.

The Division of Family Services appeals

that judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Judge Christine Durham,
presiding, denied a motion to dismiss as to the Division of
Family Services on July 13, 1979.
and 13,

Trial was held August 12

1981, in the Third District Court before Judge Kenneth
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Rigtrup.

Judgment was entered against the Division of Family

Services and $20,000 damages awarded.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant Division of Family Services seeks
reversal of the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and reversal
of the judgment entered by Judge Rigtrup.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jennifer Little, the 2 1/2 year-old daughter of
the respondents, was removed from the custody of her parents
by the Juvenile Court on April 6,

-

1977 (R. p. lOlY.

The child was

placed in the custody of the Utah Division of Family Services
and placed first in a shelter home, then in a foster home in
late April, 1977 (T. pp.

7, 20).

The foster parents, Russell

and Pearl Meik, were trained for therapeutic foster care, with
emphasis placed on children with handicaps or special behavioral
or emotional problems (T. pp. 15,16,69,70).
Jennifer Little had a history 'of behavioral and
physical difficulties (T. pp.
as having autistic tendencies.

47), and had been characterized
One symptom exhibited by

Jennifer was "head-banging," or the habit of hitting her head
against stationary objects (T. p.

21).

The Meiks had several other foster children in their
home, including Floyd Hooten, a 17 year-old, mildly retarded
boy (T. P~ 17).

Floyd had, on several occasions, been asked

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to babysit for both the Meik's children and their neighbors'
children (T. pp. 261).

A neighbor, Scott Lang, testified

that Floyd was very responsible and gentle with the younger
children, and had never been known to hit them or to exhibit
any other violent or aggressive behavior toward the children
(T. p. 262).
Connie Cowley, an experienced foster care worker,
was assigned by the Division of Family Services to supervise
the foster children placed in the Meik home, including
Jennifer Little (T. p.

45).

She arranged for medical and

psychological testing of Jennifer, as well as specialized
treatment and training through Project Pitch and the
Developmental Disability Program (T. p. 54).

When Mrs.

Meik discussed Jennifer's head-banging with Connie Cowley,
explaining that she always kept Jennifer nearby and held
her during head-banging episodes so she would not hurt
herself, the worker did not instruct Mrs. Meik to take any
further action (T. p. 52).

However, Jennifer had redently

been medically examined, at the arrangement of Mrs. Cowley,
and was scheduled for further medical and psychological
treatment.
On June 4, 1977, two months after olacernent in the
~

Meik foster home, Jennifer Little died of massive brain
hemorrhage caused by sharp blows to the head (T. pp.
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945, 119).

On that day, the child had been left for a short time in the
care of her foster brother, Floyd Hooten.

According to the

police reports which were admitted as evidence, Floyd Hooten
did inflict several blows to Jennifer Little's head on the
day she died.
In December, 1978, Jonathan and Hannah Little,
respondents, filed suit against the Utah Division of Family
Services, alleging negligent placement and supervision of
.their child while in foster care.

Defendants' Motion-to

Dismiss (April 5, 1979) based, among other things, on
the Governmental Immunity Act, was denied as to the
Division of Family Services, the lower court finding that
the discretionary function exception did not apply to this
case (R.pp.62,64). The State appealed the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss {R. p. 83), but the interlocutory appeal
was rejected by this Court (R. p. 103).
The State brought a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment in April, 1981, which was granted, dismissing the
Second and Fourth claims in the complaint (R.p. 136).
The first and third claims were remaining for trial which
was set for August 12, 1981.

After a two-day trial, judgment

was entered for plaintiffs-respondents, and damages were
awarded in the amount of $20,000.
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POINT I
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY THE APPELLANT
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES' MOTION
TO DISMISS BASED ON THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
The Division of Family Services brought a Motion
to Dismiss in April, 1979, on.the basis that plaintiffs'
claims, which were founded upon the alleged negligence of the
State in selecting and supervising the foster care placement
of Jennifer Little, were barred by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Although granted in part, the Motion was

denied as to the major issues and defendants in this action.
The defendants/appellants asserted that governmental immunity
should apply to this action because the foster care worker
assigned to Jennifer Little necessarily was performing a
"discretionary function" for which immunity is retained
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-10(1).

The district court

held that the decisions relating to the placement, care and
supervision of a child in a foster home are not discretionary.
The appellants urge this court to very carefully consider
the inununity question presented here.

If governmental

immunity is not retained for a program such as foster care,
there could be serious consequences to the continued existence
of individualized foster care.

The State simply cannot

-5-
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afford to be put in the position of an insurer, guaranteeing
that nothing will ever happen to a foster child.

If

decisions regarding particular placements, ca.re and treatment are to be continually at risk, those decisions will
simply no longer be made.

The State would have to protect

itself and its workers by ·returning to institutionalized
foster care, where the children can be watched around the
clock.
Two questions.need consideration by the court;
1.

Although not raised below, it IEi.Ust be

determined whether maintenance of a foster ca.re program
is a governmental function within the meaning of the
Utah Governmental Irrununity Act.
2.

Does the discretionary function exception to

the general waiver of immunity for negligence apply to this
case?
A

THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES
WHICH RESULT FROM THEIR EXERCISE
OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 reads:
Except as may be otherwise provided
in this act, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a goverrunentai function,
governmentally-owned hospital, n-u:rsing home,
or other governmental health care facility.
Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-3 (1953).
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Respondents based their claims on the alleged negligence
of the Division of Family Services in the placement and supervision of Jennifer Little in foster care.

However, the place-

ment and supervision of foster care children is a governmental
function conducted by the Division of Family Services for the
State of Utah pursuant to statutory mandate,
§

Utah Code Ann.

55-15b-l, et seq., and therefore comes within the purview

of Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-3.

Traditionally courts have

analyzed the nature of activity in which a governmental entity
is

.

.

~ngaged

.

to determine whether it is a governmental function

or a proprietary function.

In Standiford v. Salt Lake City

Corporation, 605 P.2d 1230 (1980) the Utah Supreme Court
described several factors used by Utah courts in the past
to determine whether a governmental function was involved.
These included whether the activity was furnished for the
general public good, whether there was pecuniary profit
involved, and whether the activity was of such a nature as to
be in real competition with free enterprise.

The

Co~rt

in

Standiford, however, decided that a new test would be more
appropriate and applied a test adopted by the Michigan Supreme
Court.

This test calls for determining whether the activity

under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency or that is essential
to the core of governmental activity.

Although this test

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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breaks abruptly with past precedent and is criticized
vigorously by the dissenting judges, its application to
the Division of ·Family Services' duties involved here
still results in their categorization as governmental
functions, __ as does the application of previous,
established tests.

mor~

The Division of Family Services

provides a service which is furnished for the general public
good, it derives no pecuniary profit from its activities,
and is not in real

comp~tition

with free enterprise.

The legislature has given the Division of Family Services
the statutory duty to provide foster care, which indicates
that the legislature considers this as an essential governmental function.

The placement and supervision of foster

children is in no way comparable to the operation of a golf
course which the Court found in Standiford to be a nonessential governmental function.

Similarly, foster care

does not compare to the maintenance of a sewer system (Thomas
v. Clearfield City, No. 17338, filed February 24, 1982) or
a sledding hill in a park, Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
629 P.2d 432

(Utah, 1981).

Accordingly, this duty performed

by the Division of Family Services should be considered a
governmental function, and due to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3
the Division of Family Services is immune from suit for injury
resulting from the exercise of this function.

-8-
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B

THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES
RESULTING FROM THE PERFORMANCE
OR FAILURE TO PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-30-10(1) specifies certain

exceptions to the general .waiver of governmental immunity
for injuries proximately caused by negligent acts or
omissions committed by a governmental entity.
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee conunitted within the scope of his
employment except if the injury:
(1)
arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether
or not the discretion is abused. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1)

(1953)

(emphasis added).

To determine whether a governmental activity is discretionary
or non-discretionary many courts now apply the planningoperational test.

35 Am.Jur.

Federal Tort Claims Act § 19;

Carroll v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888

(Utah, 1972).

To apply such a test to particular conduct, a court need only
determine to what stage or level of decision-making the alleged
negligent activity belongs.

If the conduct pertains to the planning

level it is discretionary, and if it pertains to the
operational level it is non-discretionary.

However, this

neat dichotomy is not always helpful or accurate in
determining whether a certain activity is discretionary or
not.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

The planning-operational level test may be
workable when building a highway or designing a flight
pattern, but it.is simply inapplicable to a situation where
the decisions at both the superior and subordinate levels
deal with the care and needs of a particular person.

It

is very difficult to define an "operational level" in
terms of the care of a human being.
For example, in the Carroll case, supra, the Utah
Supreme Court gave some general guidelines as to what
constitutes operational level

decision-rnak~ng.

-

" [O]pera-

tional level acts are those which concern routine, everyday
matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors."
496 P.2d at 891.

The Court further stated:
. . . the decision of the road
supervisor to use berms as the sole means
·of protection for the unwary traveler
was not a basic policy decision essential
to the realization or accomplishment of some
basic government policy, program or objective.
His decision did not require the exercise 0£
basic policy evaluation, judgment, or
expertise on the part of the Road Commission.
496 P.2d at 891.

In the present case, on the other hand, the
decisions of Family Service employees regarding the placement, care and supervision of Jennifer Little or any other
foster child are far from everyday, routine matters.
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They

do require the exercise of basic policy evaluations,
judgment, and expertise on the part of the foster care worker.
The realization and accomplishment of the foster care
program rests upon the ability and freedom of foster care workers
at any level to evaluate the needs of a particular child and
the services that can be provided to that child by a particular
foster family, and make whatever placement seems to be in the
best interests of the child.
Subsequent to its decision in Carroll, supra, the
Utah Supreme Court applied the discretionary £unction exception in a case factually much more similar to the present case.
In Epting v.

State,

546 P.2d 242

(Utah, 1976), the

State of Utah was sued by a family of a person killed by a
prisoner who had escaped from a work release program
conducted by the Utah State Prison.

The court held that the

handling of a particular prisoner ''arises out of the exercise
of a discretionary function for which

subsect~on

(1) of Section

63-30-10 quoted above has retained sovereign immunity."

546

P.2d at 244.
The court's discussion of the discretionary nature
of decisions regarding persons in the State's custody is
instructive:
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In regard to the problem: whether
the placing of a prisoner in a 'work release'
program comes within subsection (1) above
quoted as 'the exercise . . . [of] • . . a
discretionary function, . . . ,' we make the
following observations: The prison authorities
are faced with the dilemma which has always
existed in penal institutions:
as to what
extent they are furnishing an education for
further crime, or for the rehabilitation of
prisoners into useful citizenship.
We think
there is not much doubt that the use of work
release programs is a worthwhile effort toward
the latter objective.
But that is within the
discretion of the prison authorities to decide.
In addition to the exercise of this judgment
as to the value and practicability of such a
program generally, there are problems about_ its
advisability as to each individual prisoner.
In order to weigh the positive values of possible
benefit for him in such a program against the
negative factors- such as the likelihood of his
escaping and engaging in more antisocial conduct,
it is essential to consider the various aspects
of his personality:
his intelligence, aptitudes
and qualities of character such as honesty,
integrity and industry; and whether he has
demonstrated a sincere desire to rehabilitate
himself so that there is a reasonable probability
that he will succeed. Accordingly, we agree
with the view of the trial court that the
handling of the prisoner Michael Hart was something which 'arises out of the exercise of a
discretionary function' for which subsection (1)
of Section 63-·30-10 quoted above has retained
sovereign inununity.
546 P.2d at 244

(emphasis added).

In Epting the court did not attempt to apply the
planning-operational level test espoused in Carroll, supra.
Human conduct, and the problems of caring for human beings
do not lend themselves well to neat definitions or tests.

-12-
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Several other courts have recognized that what
appears to be conducted at the operational level is in reality
a discretionary.function.

In Evangelical

of Adna v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246, 407 P.2d

Un~ted
44~

Breth. Church

(1966), the

plaintiff Church brought action against the state fqr the loss
of its church which was destroyed by a boy who escaped from
an "open program" work detail at a state juv-elraile correction
facility.

The Court found that the decision to assign the boy

to a program with more :t:"elaxed security measures was not
-

operational level conduct but rather purely d1scretionary.
To this end, it calls into play
the exercise of executive expertisew
evaluation and judgment in an area
involving many variable human, emotional and psychological factors and
about which widely divergent opinions
c.an and do exist.
The decisions
required are not unlike those called
for in the legislative and judicial
processes of government . . . The
decisions involved were, within-the
framework of necessary executive ana
administrative processes of government,
purely discretionary, if not in fac:t
quasi-judicial in character.
(Emphasis added.)
407 P.2d at 447.
Similarly, the Court in Jarret v. Wills, 235 Ore. 51, 383 P.2d
995 (1963) , recognized that decisions concerning the amount of
supervision required for a particular individual must necessarily
be discretionary.

Referring to a superintendent of a home for
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the mentally deficient the Court stated:
His responsibilities require him to
make constant discretionary judgment. Like
the Board of Parole and Probation or the
Superintendent of the State Hospital, he is
required as the State's keeper of these
unfortunates and in behalf of the state, to
judge and govern human beings and human
conduct, a judgment devoid of any of the
standard weights and measures available for·
the decisions made by other public officials.
There would be few of his decisions that
would not be discretionary. 383 P.2d at 998.
These cases are particularly pertinent to the duties involved
in-the placement_and supervision of Jennifer Little.

All

three courts recognized that discretion on the part of the
employees was necessary for the proper functioning of the
program involved.

Similarly, the foster care program requires

the foster care workers to exercise their discretion concerning
their own assessments of the homes, families and children
involved.

Without this element of discretion a foster care

program could not function, for not all foster children and
foster parents are alike.

Simple operational level decisions

cannot possible apply to the program.

All foster care decisions

are of necessity discretionary.
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that it had
always followed the lead of cases interpreting the Federal
Tort Claims Act in using the planning-operational level test
to separate discretionary from non-discretionary governmental
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functions.

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (1980).

However,

federal courts have recognized the limitations on the
applicability of this test.

In a leading case dealing with

the meaning of the word "discretion" as used by the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the court recognized that the
level of government action goes
of programs by administrations.

farth~r

plan~ing

than the initiation

(This is contrary to the

decision of the district court in the present case.)
. . . [t]he discretionarv function or
duty .
includes more than-· the initiation
of programs ·and activities.
tt also includes
determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications,
or schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion.
It necessarily follows that acts
of subordinates in carrying out the operations
of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable.
If i t were
not so, the protection of§ 2680(a) would
fail at a time it would be needed, that is,
when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step, each action or non-action
being directed by the supervisor, exercising,
perhaps abusing, discretion. ·(Emphasis added.)
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956- (1953),
Id. At 36.
The United States District Court in Sullivan v. United States,
129 F.Supp. 713

(N.D.Ill. 1955) also recognized the necessity

for an extension of the ideas of planning level discretionary
action.

That court held that any activity of a government

employee at the operational level performed in accordance

-15-
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with the official plan or program constitutes performance
of a discretionary function since its source is discretionary.
·Also, federal courts have shown an unwillingness
to apply the test where the performance at the operational
level is not clearly spelled out by exact specifications.
Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Barton v.
-

United States, 609 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1979), upheld the
trial court's decision in dismissing a claim against the
Bureau of Land Management for injury caused a rancher in
t~rnporarily

denying grazing sights.

The court found the

Bureau of Land Management's decision to be discretionary
and thus, the Bureau of Land Management was immune from
suit for resulting injury.

In assessing what functions

constitute discretionary functions the court stated:
Concisely stated, the rule is that if-a government official in performing his
statutory duties must act without reliance
upon a fixed or readily ascertainable standard, the decision he makes is discretionary
and within the exception of the Tort Claims
Act.
Id. at 979.

-16-
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A United States District Court also found that non-specific
duties imposed on governmental entities necessarily are
discretionary functions.

In Gray v. United States, 445

F.Supp. 337 (S.D. Texas 1978), the court found that determining what is "safe for use" is a discretionary function
performed by the Federal Drug Administration.

The court

distinguished this kind of duty from that in Griffin v.
United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir. 1974), where the
Federal Tort Claims Act_discretionary function exception
did not bar suit in review of the specific. detailed criteria
listed in the regulation governing the agency.

Gray v. U.S.,

at 341.
The Division of Family Services has no specific
detailed criteria on the placement and
children.

superv~sion

At most, there are general guidelines.

of foster
Anything

more narrow would have to be non-functional because the
varying needs of the special problems of the children involved require varying levels and degrees of supervision- and
treatment.

If the case workers for the foster care program

were forced to work constrained by a narrow set of operational
rules, all foster children would get the· same kind of treatment and supervision regardless of their special needs.
would be highly undesirable.

This

The result is that the foster
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care program is not run on an operational level but is
necessarily discretionary.
The fact that certain programs run by the state
are necessarily discretionary is one of the main reasons
for the retention of governmental immunity.

Because

governmental custodial programs are found to be desirable
and necessary, whether they be penal or health care programs, it is necessary that they not be threatened by
continual civil actions.

Twenty-four hour supervision

in custodial programs is neither desirable nor feasible
in all cases.

If governmental immunity is not allowed for

these programs their very existence is threatened if there
is liability for any accident which might occur.
The policy of allowing governmental immunity to
protect the quality and existence of beneficial programs
has been upheld by this Court.

In Blonquist v. Summit

County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 481 P.2d 430 (1971), the Court
noted:
It is of great importance to public
officials, to the governmental unit they act
in behalf of, and even mo.re important to the
stability and efficiency of government, that
public officials should not be held liable for
damages for acts done in good faith in the performance of their duties where the exercise of
any discretion is involved even though they may
make a mistake in judgment. The general law is
quite uniformly to that effect.
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* * *It would be quite impractical and
unfair to require them to act at their own
risk.
This would not only be disruptive of the
proper functioning of public institutions,
but-undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible persons from accepting the responsibilities of public office. Accordingly, it is
the settled policy of the law that when a public
official acts in good faith, believing what he does
to be within the scope of his authority arid in the
line of his duty, he is not liable for damages
even if he makes a mistake in the exercise of his
judgment.
483 P.2d at 434! 436.
Likewise, in Sheffield v. Turner, 2 Utah 2d 314, 445
P.2d 367, 369 (1968), the Court stated that there-is:
. the imperative need for those able
in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable
freedom to discharge the burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining
discipline of a large number of men who have been
convicted of serious crime.
If such officials are
too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward
which may happen to inmates a number of evils follow, including a breakdown of discipline, and the
fact that capable persons would be discouraged
from taking such public positions.
Whether certain governmental action will be classified as
discretionary and thus allowed governrnenatl irmnuni ty- may rest
squarely on the decision whether the challenged action is
considered operational or planning.

For this reason the court

in Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 527

(7th Cir. 1980), con-

cluded that the determination of whether an action should
be deemed operational or planning must be made by considering
whether governmental immunity is desired for the activity

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

involved .
. . . ITJhe existence of a discretionary
function, and thus the potential for
governmental liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, ultimately rests upon the
characterization of the challenged behavior
as "policy" or operations." In making this
determination, relevant considerations include whether or not the nature of the judg· ment exercised called for policy considerations, Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d
1059 (3rd Cir. 1974), and whether the Act
complained of is "the result of a judgment
or decision which i t is necessary that the
Government official be free to make without
fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious
suits and alleged personal liability," Ove
Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 2-ggF. 2 d 6 5 5 , 6 5 9 ( 2 d Cir. 19 6 2) .
The risk of liability to the Division of Family
Services would be too great if it could be held responsible
for any accident occurring in a foster home.

The only way

to protect against such liability, absent governmental
irrununity, would be to return to institutional child care.
Such

a

solution is obviously contrary to the best interests

of children needing foster care.
The compelling need for governmental inununity for
the Division of Family Services to allow the continuance of
the foster care program requires that the waiver of· governmental
irrununity be read narrowly and that the discretionary acts of
the Division of Family Services foster care workers be inunune
from suit as is the clear intention of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DR.
JANICE SARGEANT TO TESTIFY.
Dr. Janice Sargeant was called by Plaintiffs below
to give expert testimony regarding treatment for autistic
children, particularly those who exhibit head-banging.

The

Defendants objected to the admission of Dr. Sargeant's
testimony (T. p. 128) based upon Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence, which states:

If the

witn~ss

is testifying ~s an expert~
testimony of the witness in tne form of opinions or inferences is limited to such
opinions as the judge finds are (a) based
on facts or dates perceived by or personally
known or made known to the witness at the
hearing, and (b) within the scope of the
special knowledge, skill, experience or training
possessed by the witness.
Rule 56 is concerned with the admissibility of expert evidence
and 56(2) in particular is· designed to insure that expert
evidence that is admitted has a proper foundation.

Dr.

Sargeant's testimony did not have adequate foundation
for two reasons.
First, the facts on which Dr. Sargeant based her
testimony were insufficient.

It was well established in

voir dire that Dr. Sargeant had no personal first hand
knowledge of Jennifer or her problems.

She had never inter-

viewed or evaluated Jennifer and had seen only one report

-21-
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where Jennifer had been described as manifesting "autistic
behavior."

(T. p. 141).

Dr. Sargeant then went on to

give testimony on treatment for autistic children (T. p. 139).
There was no evidence at trial that Jennifer was ever clearly
diagnosed as autistic.

Therefore, Dr. Sargeant's testimony

was not supported by the facts.
In the Utah Supreme Court case Day v. Lorenzo Smith
and Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), i t was
held that the trial court did not err in disallowing testimony
-

by a police officer who did not have sufficient first hand
knowledge to testify.

The officer had been at the scene of

the accident but did not personally observe the impact·.
Officer Sherwood's credentials were not in issue.

There was

no question that twenty-four years of experience in investigating accidents qualified officer Sherwood to testify as
to the general subject of automobile accidents.

Similarly,

in the instant case, there are no objections to Dr. Sargeant's

qualifications to testify about possible ways to treat
autistic children.

In Day, notwithstanding officer Sherwood's

expertise, the Supreme Court held that his testimony concerning conclusions about the impact was not supported by
sufficient facts and thus was not admissible.
~r.

In this case,

Sargeant testified in the area of proper treatment for

autistic children when there was no evidence to indicate

-22-
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Jennifer was ever diagnosed as autistic.

Dr. Sargeant

testified that a child had serious problems if head-banging
started suddenly at age two and one half when there was no
evidence whatsoever that Jennifer never banged her head
until age two and one-half or that Jennifer fit into the
category of children Dr. Sargeant was referring to as
"head-bangers."

Dr. Sargeant also testified extensively

about possible treatment methods for head-bangers, which
the trial judge relied
decision.

~pon

heavily in making his final

However, Dr. Sargeant had never observed Jennifer

Little in the act of head-banging, had never examined her,
and was not even present in the courtroom to hear other
witnesses describe Jennifer's behavior.

Dr. Sargeant had

no actual knowledge regarding Jennifer's head-banging, and
had no idea whether her problem fit into the same category
as the serious head-bangers about whom she was testifying.
In short, Dr. Sargeant testified as to matters lacking
in foundation and unsupported by the facts of the case.

Admitting her testimony was error under both Day v. Lorenzo
Smith and Son, Inc., and Utah Rule of Evidence 56(2) (a).
Defendants continued their objections to this testimony at
trial (T. pp. 150-151).
The second reason:that there was insufficient
foundation for Dr. Sargeant's testimony is that her testimony
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was based on what she had been told by the appellee's
attorney, Mr. Littlefield.

It was established at trial

on cross examination that Dr. Sargeant had not been present
to hear the testimony of any of the other _witnesses and
therefore could not have based her testimony on information
given by the other witnesses (T . p. 127).

Any familiarity

she had with the facts of the case she gained outside the
court room.
In Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah, 1979),
the-Supreme Court of Utah held that testimony regarding
conclusions of the expert witness from talking to witnesses
before trial was properly disallowed.

The court explained,

"The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity
with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his
opinion and the facts adduced must be established."

Id. at

133-··In his objection to the trial court allowing Dr.
Sargeant to testify Mr. Barlow (co-counsel for defendant below)
pointed out the hearsay problem involved (T. p. 128).-

This

problem was also recognized by the Supreme Court in
Didericksen:
The question posed in the instant case was not
limited to testimony which was adduced at trial;
it clearly opened the door to hearsay evidence
gleaned from talking with persons outside the
court room whose testimony may not have been
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admitted or admissable at trial.
The
interjection of such hearsay testimony,
cloaked in the form of an expert opinion,
would have been impermissible and potentially highly prejudicial.
597 P.2d at 1332.
Therefore, not only was Dr. Sargeant 1 s testimony
based on an inadequate factual predicate, but on hearsay as
well.

The fact that the trial court refused to strike Dr.

Sargeant's testimony was not only error, but prejudicial
error.

The trial judge_was obviously swayed by the doctor's

list of possible ways to treat a child wlth a head--banging
problem.

The judge decided the Division of Family Service's

negligence on the basis that the Division had not employed
one of the several treatments suggested by Dr. Sargeant
(namely protective headgear).

The trial judge's substantial

reliance on evidence which lacked adequate foundation renders
admission of the testimony prejudicial error.

-25-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES WAS
NEGLIGENT.
In finding that the Division of Family Services
was negligent in the care of Jennifer Little, ·Judge Rigtrup
stated that the Division had "a duty to exercise reasonable
care in affording protection to the child."

(T.p. 273).

Later, in further discussing his decision, the Judge characterized the duty as the "duty to protect."

(.T.p. 274).

The

-

court then went on to find that said duty was breached by
the failure to provide protective headgear to Jennifer
(T. pp. 273,274).

Jennifer eventually died, and the Division

of. Family Services "was held liable for the death although
there was no finding or evidence that the "negligence" of
the Division in not buying a helmet proximately caused the
death (See Point IV, below).

The description of duty and

the resultant liability in this case set a very dangerous
precedent.

If the duty is one of blanket "protection-,"

then the State could be found to have breached that duty
whenever anything happens to a foster child, regardless
of the reasonableness of the actions taken by the foster
care workers.

In effect, this case, if followed, would

create a standard of strict liability.

-26-
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In announcing his decision, Judge Rigtrup attached
"reasonableness" to the standard of care, or duty to protect. (T.
p. 273). However, his finding of negligence seems to totally ignore
all the evidence of reasonableness.

The only finding of

negligence was based on the failure of the Division to
provide, or instruct the foster parents to provide, protective
head gear (a helmet) .

(T. pp. 273-274).

Even that

expectation is unreasonable based on the evidence, and the
finding of negligence

w~s

erroneous.

Appellants therefore

request the Court to review the evidence a-nd reverse the
district court's conclusion that the Division of Family
Services was negligent.
The district court only found one instance of
"negligence"·--the failure to provide a helmet.

That finding

was based upon the testimony of Dr. Janice Sargeant (see
Point I!), who suggested a helmet as one possible means of
controlling head-banging.

The pertinent portion of Dr.

Sargeant's testimony follows:
Q. Are there any means available for controlling
the head banging behavior?
A.
Yes.
Q. What are they?
A. Well, there are a variety. One is selective
at~ention in that ~ou give attention and lasts of it when
he s.not head banging, and no attention when he is head
banging. That would be the first item.
Also, you might
proceed from there to do some kind of punishment procedure,
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something like using time outs or isolation in a room
whenever there's head banging.
Q.
Time out?
A.
That would be isolation of the child, or some
other kind of punishment procedure like overcorrection,
which involves having a child repeat a certain series
of behaviors many, many times so that eventually the
head banging is discouraged.
' Q.
Are you talking about spanking the child or
striking the child in that situation?
- A.
No. No .. For example, telling the child to stand
up and sit down, stand up and sit down, stand up and
sit down, which is one overcorrection procedure. Another
would be the use of light water spray in his face whenever
head banging occurs, which is also effective.
In some cases where .the head banging is intense in
autistic children, they have even used electric shock
where there ~as danger of the child's retina detaching
because the banging was so severe.
The use of helmets and tranquilizers or drugs or
sedatives has also been used.
There are a variety of
techniques available for that behavior.
(T.

pp. 132-133.)
Use of a helmet is only one of many possible responses

suggested by Dr. Sargeant; in fact, it is almost given as an
aside at the end of the list.
to ignore the head-banging.

The first method suggested is
At trial, the foster mother,

Mrs. Meik, testified that she kept Jennifer in the same room
with her at all possible times, and if she became
concerned that Jennifer might hurt herself from the head-banging,
she would hold Jennifer until she calmed down (T. pp. 39, 228).
Thus, Mrs. Meik prevented any serious harm from occurring due
to the head-banging.

(Although there was some testimony as

to some bruises possibly relating to the head-banging, there
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was no evidence of serious harm caused by this behavior.)
Based upon Dr. Sargeant's testimony, giving no specific
attention to Jennifer's head-banging, except for the efforts
of Mrs. Meik in restraining her for protection, was reasonable care.
Dr. Sargeant also suggested isolating a head banging
child, spraying water in the child's face, or even using
electric shock or drugs in some cases.

Surely the Division

of Family Services could not be found negligent for
-

failure to utilize any one of the many alternative
suggestions offered by Dr. Sargeant, especially when the
attraction of that particular method to the Judge seemed
to be his experience with a helmet used by his nephew who
was not a head-banger (T. p. 273).
The foster mother did take reasonable care to
prevent Jennifer Little from harming herself when she began
head banging.

Furthermore, Connie Cowley had confidence in

this- foster mother's ability to care for Jennifer in this
situation because she had previously had another foster child
with similar behavior (T. pp. 51, 76, 80), and Mrs. Cowley,
the worker, had seen no indication that Jennifer was seriously
injuring herself (T. p. 62).

Thus, the finding of negligence

based upon the failure to provide a helmet was clearly in
error.

-29-
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In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. pp. 159-162) filed after the trial, to which the
Appellants repeatedly objected,

{R. pp. 149-153), several

other "violations of duty" are cited which were never even
mentioned by the Judge in his ruling at trial (See paraqraph
10, R. p. 160) .
The first finding (objected to by appellants,
paragraph 3, R.

p~

153) was that the Division of Family

Services failed "to adequately train JENNIFER'S foster
parents or whoever would take care of the child when the
foster parents were gone."

On the contrary, the Court

specifically found that "the Meiks were qualified parents,
were good parents, were conscientious parents . . . "
p. 274).

(T.

The record also shows that the Meiks were thor-

oughly trained, both as basic and therapeutic foster parents
{R. pp. 35, 36, 39).

The quality and sufficiency of that

training was never questioned by the Judge.

The only mention

made about lack of direction or training was that the- ·
Division of Family Services never told the Meiks specifically
that Jennifer should have protective head gear (T. p. 274).
As has been previously discussed, that single omission
simply cannot be seen as negligence.
The second finding (also obejected to by appellants,
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R. p. 153) was that the Division of Family Services failed
"to make timely evaluations of her condition to prevent
potential serious harm and injury."

Again, there was

absolutely no such finding at trial, and no evidence to
support it.

Jennifer Little had been evaluated several

times before she was removed from her home.

(T. p. 57).

She had been examined at both the University Hospital and
Primary Children's Hospital (T. p. 55).
for Jennifer had been

d~veloped

A treatment plan

that would have started that

summer with a home-based program particlpated in previously
by the Meiks

(PITCH) and would have continued into the fall

with another program (Developmental Disability Program),
both programs designed to treat children showing autistic
tendencies as did Jennifer (R. p. 54).

The appellees' expert

witness, Dr. Sargeant, testified that she believed these
programs were adequate to treat autistic children (R. p. 145).
Jennifer's needs.were thoroughly evaluated and treatment
programs planned.

The evidence supports no finding-of

negligence in this respect.
The third finding of breach of duty (Paragraph 10
(c), r. p. 160) relates to the failure to provide a helmet
previously discussed.

It is interesting to note that before

signing the Findings of Fact, Judqe Riqtrup altered this
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particular paragraph to state that the helmet would have
"reduced the risk of possible serious harm and injury."
There is no finding at all that the failure to provide a
helmet in fact caused any harm, much less the death.
Finally, the written Findings of Face included
the following "violation o"f duty"
Appellant, R. p. 153):

(again objected to by

"Lack of proper supervision at all

times as indicated by allowing the child to be left under the
supervision arid care of FLOYD HOOTEN, a seventeen (17) year
old-child who was in the custody of the MEIKS because of
his own special problems and who slapped the child around
during said care, triggering cerebral hemorhaging that
brought about Jennifer's untimely death."

No finding of any

kind relating to Floyd Hooten was made at trial.
It would certainly go far beyond reasonableness to
expect a Division of Family Services worker to be present or
"supervising" at a foster home "at all times."

The Division

cannot assign a worker to supervise every foster home around
the clock.

Further, the evidence shows that it was not at

all unreasonable to leave Jennifer for a short time in the
care of Floyd Hooten.

Floyd had no history of violent or

agressive behavior toward children (T. pp. 41, 262), had
never been known to strike Jennifer or other smaller children,
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\

(T. p. 41), and had shown himself to be a responsible
babysitter (T. p. 262).

No amount of supervision by

the foster care ·worker would have changed the reasonableness
of leaving Jennifer in Floyd's care.
Again, the only finding of negligence

mad~

by the

district court judge in his oral ruling was based on the
failure to provide a helmet.

This and all other written

findings regarding breach of duty are not supported by the
evidence, and the trial court's finding that the Division
of Family Services was· negligent was ·error. and should be
reversed.
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POINT IV
THE NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, OF THE DIVISION
OF FAMILY SERVICES WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF JENNIFER LITTLE.
Even if the Division of Family Services was negligent
in failing to provide prote.cti ve headgear to Jenni£ er Little,

there was-absolutely no evidence or finding that such
negligence was the proximate cause of Jennifer Little's
death.

In fact, in his oral ruling, Judge Rigtrup stated that

the actual cause of death was not particularly important to
the -court:
Whether or not Jennifer's death
resulted from a blow or blows by Floyd
Hooten, or whether it resulted from her
banging her head on the floor or the wall,
whether it resulted from the cumulative
effects of a combination of those incidents
of trauma, I don't think are really
particularly important to the Court.
T. pp. 272-273.

Assessing liability against the Division of

Family Services with no showing or finding of proximate cause
is reversible error.
In an action for wrongful death which is based on
negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing not only
that there was negligence, but also that the negligence was
the proximate cause of the death.
Hall v. Blackham, 417 P.2d 664
462 P.2d 1020 (Nev. 1970).

22 Am.Jur.2d, Peath,

§

222.

(Utah, 1966); Thomas v. Bokelman,

Negligence and proximate cause are
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separate concepts.
1973).

May v. Baklini, 509 P.2d 1345 (N.Mex.,

"Assuming plaintiff made a prima facie showing of

showing of defendants' negligence, this was insufficient.
A showing of proximate cause was also required."

Id. at 1346.

In a recent case this Court recognized that the
plaintiff must sustain the burden of proof on both the issue
of negligence and the issue of proximate cause.

"[W]hile

there may have been negligence on the part of the defendants,
such negligence does not automatically render them liable."
·-

Cooke v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah, 1981}.

As to the

burden of proof on causation, the court has stated:
It is a fundamental principle of the
law of negligence that the person complaining
has the burden of showing a causal connection
between the negligent conduct complained of
and the injury to the plaintiff.
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith Inc., 132.P.2d 680 (Utah, 1943).
[T]he evidence must do more than merely
raise a conjecture or show a probability . . •
[W]here the proximate cause of the injury is
left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as
a matter of law.
Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 {Utah, 1955).
The plaintiff cannot sustain a case on the mere
speculation or possibility that the defendant's negligence
was a cause of the alleged injury.

On this subject, Prosser

stated in Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 241 that:
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On the issue of the fact of causation,
as on other issues essential to his cause of
action for negligence, the plaintiff, in
general, has the burden of proof.
He must
introduce evidence which affords a reasonable
basis for the conclusion that it is more likely
than not that the conduct of the defendant
was a substantial factor in bringing about
the result.
A mere possibility of such
causation is not enough; and when the matter
-- remains one of pure speculation or conjecture,
or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced,
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a
verdict for the defendant.
As this Court discussed in Devine v. Cook,

supra:

_ While deductions m~y be based on
probab1lities, the evidence must do more than
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability.
Where there are probabilities the other way
equally or more potent the deductions are mere
guesses and the jury should not be permitted to
speculate.
The rule is well estab1ished in this
jurisdiction that where "the proximate cause of
the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff
must fail as a matter of law."
[Cites omitted.]
Many cases are cited in support of this pro~usition
and the court quoted with approv~l £rom 29 Cyc. 625
where it is stated:
"The evidence must, however,
do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a
probability as to the cause of the injury, and no
recovery can be had if the evidence leaves it to
conjecture which of two probable causes resulted
in the injury, where defendant was liable £or
only one of them."
279 P.2d at 1083.
Further, negligence is not actionable if an intervening act was the proximate cause of the injury:
But it is the plaintiff's burden to establish
that such prior negligence was the proximate cause
of the subsequent injury.
This entails the
requirement that the subsequent injury be one
which might reasonably be expected to follow from
the original act and injury; and without any new
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and independent, unforeseeable occurrence which
effectively caused the second injury.
If there
is such a later causative occurrence, it is
deemed to be the intervening, efficient and
therefore the proximate cause of such injury.
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Utah, 1971).
As the Nevada Supreme Court said in another wrongful
death action:
Negligence, is not actionable unless,
without the intervention of an intervening
cause, it proximately causes the harm for which
complaint was made.
An intervening cause means
not a concurrent and contributing cause but a
superseding cause which is itself the natural
and logical cause of the harm.
~

Thomas v. Bokelrnan, supra, 462 P.2d at 1022.
In Cooke v. Mortensen, supra, this Court held that an
injury sustained by a tenant while trying to open a window
which had been negligently painted shut by the landlord could
not be attributed to the landlord's negligence because the
tenant's intervening negligence was the proximate cause:
Further, and again assuming defendants'
negligence, we concur with the trial court that
the landlords' failure to unstick a window could
not reasonably be calculated to result in the
injury incurred herein.
Rather, this injury was
caused by the independent and intervenery action
of the plaintiff.
When there exist two possible
causes for an injury, and these causes are
independent of each other, the later and intervening cause is generally to be viewed as the
proximate cause of the accident.
624 P.2d at 676.
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In the present case, there is no evidence at all
which shows that the Division of Family Services' negligence
(if any) in not providing protective headgear to Jennifer
Little was causally related to her death.

A helmet may have

helped to prevent Jennifer from bruising herself, while
head-banging, but there is no affirmative link between
the head-banging and lack of headgear and the death.
Plaintiff below attempted at length to show
through the testimony of Dr. Serge Moore that Jennifer's
dea~h

may have been caused by the "aggregate trauma" of

continuous episodes of head-banging(T .. pp. 99-100).

How-

ever, Dr. Moore testified that the blow which caused
Jennifer's death did not result from her banging her own
head against a solid object,
(T. p. 105).

such as a wall or toilet

Further, he testified that the headbanging

and aggregate trauma theref rorn ought to be considered as
a possible contributing factor in the death (T. pp. 117-118).
However, a final,

significant blow would have been necessary

to cause death in any case; "the smaller injuries alone, the
bruises alone, would not have caused her death."
Furthermore, the final single episode could

ver~

(T. p. 119).
well have

caused the death itself, whether there was aggregate
not (T .. p. 119).

~yauma

Dr. Moore also testified that the final

bl\..~~T

which caused Jennifer's death was not the result of banging

-38-
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or

her head against a solid object, but rather was the result
of being hit by a blunt object with a soft structure
covering it, such as a hand or fist

(T. p. 110).

The police reports, which were admitted into
evidence, show that Floyd Hooten, the 17-year-old foster
brother, did strike Jennifer Little with his hand or fist
several times.

Jennifer's death followed immediately.

evidence is undisputed.

This

Floyd Hooten's actions were the

proximate cause of the death.

While the aggregate trauma
,_

from the head-banging may have contributed to the death, and
that is mere speculation, the death would not have occurred
without the final blows by Hooten; and, the death might, at
least as probably,

have occurred as a result of Hooten's

blows alone, aggregate trauma or not.
In Widefield Hornes, Inc. v. Griego, 416 P.2d 365
(Colo., 1966), the Supreme Court of Colorado held:
In order to make out a prima f acie
case, the plaintiff's proof was required
to show that the alleged defective
__
construction of the drain cover was, to say
the least, the probable cause of plaintiff's
injuries; in this case, however, it is only
one of several possible causes. We have
heretofore held that where the state of the
record is sufficient to establish only a
possible connection between an act or
condition and a result, it is not sufficient
in law to impose liability.
We cannot affirm
a judgment based upon mere possibilities as the
law deals only in probability and reasonably
established fact.

416 P.2d at

366-367.
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Similarly, in a wrongful death case, the Alaska
Supreme Court held:
A mere possibility of causation is
not enough.
When the matter remains one
of conjecture, as it does here, the trial
court must find against the party carrying
the burden of proof.
City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 204

(Alaska, 1962)

In the instant case, the "negligence" of the Divisior
of Family Service in not providing a helmet to Jennifer Little

for protection from head-banging is only a possible contributins
fac~or,

certainly not the sole cause, and very probably not eve

a contributing cause of death.

Assessment of liability against

the Division of Family Services based upon such "neg1igence,"
with no proximate cause, was clear error.
Although the lower court made no finding whatsoever
of causation during the oral ruling at the close of trial,
and the defendants objected to any such finding suddenly
appearing in the written findings several weeks later (R.
pp. 150-153), it is instructive to note that, by

in~~lineatio1

the Judge acknowledged that the death actually resulted from
the blows by Floyd Hooten (R. p. 161), and only that

protectiv~

headgear might have reduced the risk of harm from head banging.
It is clear that the proximate cause of Jennifer
Little's death was the actions of Floyd Hooten, which are not
attributable to the Division of Family Services (see Point III
supra).

The written Findings of Fact assert that the Division
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of Family Services was negligent due to "lack of proper
supervision at all times as indicated by allowing the
child to be left under the supervision and care of Floyd
Hoo t en.

. ."

R. p. 153).

(R. pp. 160-161;

Defendants' Objection,

As has been previously discussed, ther~ was

absolutely no reason for the Division of Family Services
to foresee that Jennifer Little might be harmed if left
in the care of Floyd Hooten.
There is. a duty to take affirmative
action to control the wrongfu~-acts of
third persons only where the [defendant]
. . . has reasonable cause to anticipate
such act and the probability of injury
resulting therefrom.
Thomas v. Bokelman, supra, 462 P.2d at 1022.
Further, the duty to supervise a child in placement
does not extend to the point of insuring that nothing will
ever happen to that child.
In Sly v. Board of Education of Kansas City, 516
P.2d 895 (Kansas, 1973), and Schafer v. State of Montana
Department of Institutions, 592 P.2d 493

(Montana, 1979),

governmental agencies were held to have the duty to supervise
a particular individual or group of individuals.

However,

in both cases the Supreme Courts refused to find that this
duty extended to include the duty to prevent unforeseeable
intervening events from occurring.

Both courts found in cases

where an unforseeable intervening event is the cause of the
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injury that lack of supervision on the part of the agency is
not the proximate cause and the agency is not liable for
the resulting injury.

Both cases also expressly stated

that to hold otherwise would be to place the duty of an
insurer on the agency, which was not intended.
In the Schafer case, which involved injuries to a
girl committed to the custody of the State Department of
Institutions, the court conunented on the role of agency
supervision in preventing the unforseen acts of third
pe~sons.

The in]ury to the child, caused by the negligence

of a third person driving an automobile,

"easily could have

occurred no matter what type of supervision the State exercised
over her, short of locking her in a room somewhere.

Such

restrictive detention is not the goal of our juvenile
institutions and programs."

592 P.2d at 496.

Similarly, no reasonable amount of supervision by
the Division of Family Services worker could have guaranteed
that Jennifer Little would not be injured by Floyd aooten.
The only way to provide such supervision would be to remove
children from individual foster homes and place them in
closed institutions where they could be under 24-hour watch.
The lower court not only made no supportable finding
of proximate cause, but in fact stated that the cause of
death (in a wrongful death action) was of no particular
importance.

There was no showing that any negligence on the
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part of the Division of Family Services was the proximate cause
of Jennifer Little's death, and the judgment should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Appellant
Division of Family Services requests the Court to reverse the
district court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss based upon
the substantive provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

Further, the Appellants request

re~eFsal

of

th~

final judgment rendered against the Division of Family
Services.
Dated this

31st

day of March, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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